The role of the Durham Light Infantry in the Peninsular War

By John Sadler

Tradition Magazine 59

Part II

Continued from Tradition number fifty eight

Chapter 4 The First Year in The Peninsula 1811

The 689th that sailed for the Peninsula included 89 men who had served since 1800 and all but 250 of the rest had seen Walcheren. It is therefore fair to say that the regiment was quite experienced. Only 47 per cent were English, 42 per cent were Irish, and 11 per cent were Scottish. The colours were left at Lewes which was unusual and then on the  7th June they embarked for Lisbon, on board the Melponene, which was reached on the 28th June. After being accommodated in a convent for a few weeks they marched to Arronches by the 17th July where they were to become part of the 7th division under Major General Houston. This division was singulary undistinguished. It included the 51st, the 85th the  Chasseurs Britanniques. It was largely composed however of Portuguese regiments and was aptly christened the mongrels. Although it had suffered at Badjoz it was not to gain any sort of reputation until late in 1812 and the fighting in the Pyrenees in 1813.

By this date the crisis of the Peninsular war had come and gone. At the unfougth battle of Caia. Wellington had stared down two French armies assembled to enter Portugal and make them turn back.

Now in 1811  the armies of Soult and Marmont had dispersed, thus giving Wellington his chance to invade Spain. The only really feasible route was the one to the north through Avdad Rodrigs therefore all Wellingtons efforts and all his army save one corps were concentrated until January 1812 upon the rduction of Advad Rodrigs.

On the 9th August the 7th division was despatched to Vilar-major where it was to remain for six weeks. On th 23rd September the 7th was moved to Alamedilla to prevent any reinforcements reaching Avdad Rodrigs. The 68th however was stationed separately at Aedeia-de-Ribeira for three days then it was moved back to Albergueria. During this period the 7th was almost always in reserve as naturally Wellington was more likely to use his experienced divisions for the fighting. At this time however the army was being settled in its winter cantonments and so by the 30th September the  7th had been moved farther back.

In November the 68th moved to Pedroges. All during this period the regiment was still suffering very badly from the effects of Walcheren fever. In October there were 367 sick and only 323 present, fit. Until February 1812 an average if 25 men per month were dying of the disease. By March 1812 there were less than 300 present, fit.

Chapter 5 The Second Year In The Peninsula 1812

After only a two-week siege in January Cudad Rodrigs fell and the army marched on to the investment of Badajoz which was accomplished though not easily by the first week of April. Wellington wished to march south to Seville and thus clear the Andalusias of the French but although this was attempted it had to be abandoned after the French attempted to blockade Cudad Rodrigs. Now he aimed to strike at French communications through Castile which in itself would have brought about the evacuation of the Andalusias. This object was accomplished by the battle of Salamanca on 22nd July.

As always the 7th was employed as a reserve and as a covering force both at Cudad Rodrigs and Badajoz. By the 25th April it was back in the Beira hills, the  68th being stationed at Sto Estevas.

By late May the army was on the move towards Salamanca crossing the Agueda in three columns. Along whith the 1st and 6th divisions the 7th marched on the right. By the 18th June the whole army 40.000 strong was drawn up along the heights of S. Cristobar, a low ridge running to the north-east of Salamanca.

Wellington waited two days for the French and on the 20th Marmont appeared with 20.000 men. Wellington then drew up his battle line in the expectation of a major encounter. The 7th were on the right wing.

Along with some Brunswickers the 68th were occupying the advance post of Momscos. A partial advance of the French army brought them into a sharp fight as a result of which the French were beaten back although the 68th lost six dead, 20 wounded and two taken prisoner.

The next day there was no fighting at all but on the 22nd the 68th was sent to help an advanced brigade which had captured a knoll above Momscos and were engaged in a sharp struggle with the French. Together with these the 68th stood off several counter attacks until eventually the French Withdrew. The 68th suffered only one casualty during this engagement. The next morning the whole French army withdrew.

The next month involved a protracted series of insignificant feints, thrusts and counter-thrusts. By the 19th of July the two armies were drawn up facing one another, the French having been considerably reinforced in the previous month. All the eye witnesses remark upon the magnificent spectacle which the two armies provided – spectacular but pointless, there was no battle that day  or for the next two days.

On the 21st Wellington resumed his original attack on. S. Cristobar but was obliged to swing his army about onto a raised plateau facing south-east over the Pelagareia steam to meet the French who had crossed the Huerta. The 7th division occupied the extreme right flank of the army. It was here that the battle began on the 22nd when Marmont sent forward skirmishers from Foys division.The 68th and the 2nd Cacadores from the Portuguese brigade were sent forward to meet the attack, which they were able to repulse and they continued to hold their advance position despite fire from a French battery close by.

As a result the whole of the line became involved in a general battle as the third division attacked and drove back the head of Marmonts column. At half-past four the 7th attacked the mass of the French infantry which after a very long and costly battle were driven back into the wood. The 68th had10 men killed during the course of this battle.

The next stage in the campaign involved the pursuit of the defeated French army, although the 7th was not involved as it was diverted to enter Madrid which was done unopposed. The regiment was quartered in Madrid for a fortnight during which time Colonel Johnson was commandant of the City so the command of the 68th fell to Captain Winniett.

Late in August Wellington moved north to Diuro to finish off the army defeated at Salamanca. The 7th set out to join him on the 1st September but was held up on the 10th by a French garrison at Burgos. During the investment the 68th was bivouacked at Olmos. Here conditions were very damp and unhealthy which resulted in a considerable rise in the sick list and the regiment rapidly declined to only 245 present, fit. The investment of Burgos proved a slow and tedious operation and the town was stoutly defended. During the next few weeks a strong French force moved up and drove in the outlying British units. Not only that but a strong French force was moving up on Madrid. By the 21st October Wellington dad decided upon retreat as the only way out.

During this period the 68th was involved in several skirmishes around Olmos, to cover the retreat, but later on French pressure slackened considerably due to the foul weather which considerably dampened the morale of the troops who were obliged to march in rain and through mud as well as having top sleep out in the open during the freezing nights.

When the returns were made out on the 25th November at Alamedilla there were 235 present, fit and 247 sick.

Although there had been no casualties in the skirmishing around Olmos four men had been captured.

At the end of the retreat the 68th was placed in twin cantonments of Pecos de Bavo and Pacos de Cima. By December the strength was so low that Wellington considered fusing several weak regiments. It was rumoured that the 51st and the  68th were to be fused and moved to the light division with the 43rd and 52nd. These however did not happen.

What did happen was a considerable reorganisation of the 7th division. The 68th, 51st,1st/82nd and Chasseurs Britanniques became the fourth battalion.

During the winter conditions improved radically with new clothing, lighter duty, regular rations, reinforcements, improved quarters and new shoes. Johnston returned from Madrid in April 1813 and on the 25th of that month the strength of the regiment was up to 439, present, fit which was the highest figure since the arrival in the Peninsula.

Wellington had decided upon a plan for the invasion of Spain. He decided to face his army to the north and cross the Duoro at the ferry stations of Regua Viltainntio and Pocintio.

This plan, though simple, was totally unexpected. No one had ever thought of an invasion being planned like this. The army was divided into three columns one to take each crossing. The 7th as always was on the right and all three crossed the Duoror without mishap, however, floods made the crossing of the second obstacle the river Esla very difficult. The left and centre columns were able to cross but not the right, which had to wait until the floods subsided.

After crossing the rivers, the army was able to move across the Castilian plain eventually and enter the mountains of Cantabina all of which was accomplished without any real resistance from the French, although once in the mountains they had to face a much worse foe than the French – hunger. For some time the army was very short of food, but on the 19th June the army was positioned along the river Bayas where the French who had been continually outflanked by Wellington determined to stand and fight. Consequently they took up a strong position covering the town of Victora.

Wellington prepared to attack and he opened the fighting on the 21st which resulted in the French army being driven back to form a line between Margarita and Lemanda. The 7th was not able to participate in this action as indecision on the part of the divisional commander prevented the division being usefully deployed.

However after this bad start the 68th was able to distinguish itself by charging the village of Lemanda. Although they were obliged to shelter from artillery fire in a ditch, the coolness  and courage of the men enabled them to press the attack and clear the French from the village, the defenders were not really French at all but German irregulars, 250 of whom were captured.

As a result of this defeat on their flank the French forces crumbled and retreated, leaving their baggage behind.

These were full of treasure, of which the troops soon emptied them. When the men of the 68th were searched they were found to have an average of £32 10s.

8 ¾. They had earned it though for 26 officers and men were dead and many including Colonel Johnson were wounded.

Having invested the towns of St. Sebastian and Pamplona, both of which been heavily garrisoned by the French, Wellington advanced into the Pyrenees.

Despite his recent decisive victory Wellington was aware of the great weakness of the British position.

To invade Spain via the Pyrenees as the French could be infinitely easier, for geographical reasons, than to invade France via the Pyrenees, as the British would have to. Wellington would also have to leave two very strong garrisons of enemy behind him at St. Sebastian and Pamplona. Not only that, but the present international political situation made an invasion of France undesirable from Wellingtons point of view.

The French armies had since come under the command of Marshal Soult who soon re-established their morale, naturally low after the defeat at Vitoria. However Soult was soon able to prepare his armies for an offensive aimed at relieving Pamplona.

The result was a double pronged attack on the British positions on the 25th of July. One attack was aimed at  Hills division at the Maya and the other was aimed at Coles division at Roncesvalles. The 7th went to the assistance of Hill and the 2nd division at the pass of Maya and held the attack. However, Cole and his men had fallen back and for fear of being outflanked the 2nd and 7th divisions were obliged to retreat also.

The French were able to advance almost to Pamplona but a stand by the army in front of the town forced them back, so although Soult had forced the British to give ground he had been unable to take the town.

Soult now embarked upon a dangerous move to join up with DErlon which could only be accomplished by traversing the front of the British army. Wellington not wishing to miss such a chance to deal his enemies a severe blow attacked on the 30th July.

The 7th was detached to attack the French flank which was in a valley west of Ulzama. The French resisted considerably but eventually, and with heavy losses, the 7th drove them back. A notable officer of the  68th, Major Crespign, was killed in this action. The regiment greeted the news of his death with profound relief as he was a particularly brutal type, even in the nineteenth century when officers were never noted for their humanity.

The 31st , 82nd, 51st, Chasseurs Britanniques and the 68th were sent to dislodge a very strong body of DErlons Corps, who were very well entrenched on a steep and wooded hill from which they were able to pour fire upon Hills division which was engaging the mass of retreating enemy. The hill although almost impregnable was taken, a great tribute to the courage and tenacity of the attackers.

Several more days of shirmishing followed, the French were driven farther and farther back, their position eventually became critical although this was not apparent to Wellington who therefore did not destroy them utterly as he might have done, Soult at last rallied 25.000 of his men and prepared for a stand on the heights behind Echalar. Three British divisions instantly attacked and scattered the French forces who withdrew across the frontier.

On the 22nd August the 7th resumed the position it had occupied before the battle. During the battle the French had lost 12.500 men whereas the British losses were 6.500. The French were no longer an effective force in .


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