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The role of the Durham Light
Infantry in the Peninsular War
By John Sadler
Tradition Magazine 59
Part II
Continued from Tradition number fifty eight
Chapter 4 The First Year in The Peninsula 1811
The 689th that sailed for
the Peninsula included 89 men who had served since 1800 and all but
250 of the rest had seen Walcheren. It is therefore fair to say that
the regiment was quite experienced. Only 47 per cent were English,
42 per cent were Irish, and 11 per cent were Scottish. The colours
were left at Lewes which was unusual and then on the 7th
June they embarked for Lisbon, on board the Melponene, which
was reached on the 28th June. After being accommodated in
a convent for a few weeks they marched to Arronches by the 17th
July where they were to become part of the 7th division
under Major General Houston. This division was singulary
undistinguished. It included the 51st, the 85th
the Chasseurs Britanniques. It was largely composed however of
Portuguese regiments and was aptly christened the mongrels.
Although it had suffered at Badjoz it was not to gain any sort of
reputation until late in 1812 and the fighting in the Pyrenees in
1813.
By this date the crisis of the
Peninsular war had come and gone. At the unfougth battle of Caia.
Wellington had stared down two French armies assembled to enter
Portugal and make them turn back.
Now in 1811 the armies of Soult and
Marmont had dispersed, thus giving Wellington his chance to invade
Spain. The only really feasible route was the one to the north
through Avdad Rodrigs therefore all Wellingtons efforts and all his
army save one corps were concentrated until January 1812 upon the rduction of Advad Rodrigs.
On the 9th August the 7th
division was despatched to Vilar-major where it was to remain for
six weeks. On th 23rd September the 7th was
moved to Alamedilla to prevent any reinforcements reaching Avdad
Rodrigs. The 68th however was stationed separately at
Aedeia-de-Ribeira for three days then it was moved back to
Albergueria. During this period the 7th was almost always
in reserve as naturally Wellington was more likely to use his
experienced divisions for the fighting. At this time however the
army was being settled in its winter cantonments and so by the 30th
September the 7th had been moved farther back.
In November the 68th moved
to Pedroges. All during this period the regiment was still suffering
very badly from the effects of Walcheren fever. In October there
were 367 sick and only 323 present, fit. Until February 1812 an
average if 25 men per month were dying of the disease. By March 1812
there were less than 300 present, fit.
Chapter 5 The Second Year In The Peninsula 1812
After only a two-week siege in January
Cudad Rodrigs fell and the army marched on to the investment of
Badajoz which was accomplished though not easily by the first week
of April. Wellington wished to march south to Seville and thus clear
the Andalusias of the French but although this was attempted it had
to be abandoned after the French attempted to blockade Cudad Rodrigs.
Now he aimed to strike at French communications through Castile
which in itself would have brought about the evacuation of the
Andalusias. This object was accomplished by the battle of Salamanca
on 22nd July.
As always the 7th was
employed as a reserve and as a covering force both at Cudad Rodrigs
and Badajoz. By the 25th April it was back in the Beira
hills, the 68th being stationed at Sto Estevas.
By late May the army was on the move
towards Salamanca crossing the Agueda in three columns. Along whith
the 1st and 6th divisions the 7th
marched on the right. By the 18th June the whole army
40.000 strong was drawn up along the heights of S. Cristobar, a low
ridge running to the north-east of Salamanca.
Wellington waited two days for the
French and on the 20th Marmont appeared with 20.000 men.
Wellington then drew up his battle line in the expectation of a
major encounter. The 7th were on the right wing.
Along with some Brunswickers the 68th
were occupying the advance post of Momscos. A partial advance of the
French army brought them into a sharp fight as a result of which the
French were beaten back although the 68th lost six dead,
20 wounded and two taken prisoner.
The next day there was no fighting at
all but on the 22nd the 68th was sent to help
an advanced brigade which had captured a knoll above Momscos and
were engaged in a sharp struggle with the French. Together with
these the 68th stood off several counter attacks until
eventually the French Withdrew. The 68th suffered only
one casualty during this engagement. The next morning the whole
French army withdrew.
The next month involved a protracted
series of insignificant feints, thrusts and counter-thrusts. By the
19th of July the two armies were drawn up facing one
another, the French having been considerably reinforced in the
previous month. All the eye witnesses remark upon the magnificent
spectacle which the two armies provided – spectacular but pointless,
there was no battle that day or for the next two days.
On the 21st Wellington
resumed his original attack on. S. Cristobar but was obliged to
swing his army about onto a raised plateau facing south-east over
the Pelagareia steam to meet the French who had crossed the Huerta.
The 7th division occupied the extreme right flank of the
army. It was here that the battle began on the 22nd when
Marmont sent forward skirmishers from Foys division.The 68th
and the 2nd Cacadores from the Portuguese brigade were
sent forward to meet the attack, which they were able to repulse and
they continued to hold their advance position despite fire from a
French battery close by.
As a result the whole of the line
became involved in a general battle as the third division attacked
and drove back the head of Marmonts column. At half-past four the 7th
attacked the mass of the French infantry which after a very long and
costly battle were driven back into the wood. The 68th
had10 men killed during the course of this battle.
The next stage in the campaign
involved the pursuit of the defeated French army, although the 7th
was not involved as it was diverted to enter Madrid which was done
unopposed. The regiment was quartered in Madrid for a fortnight
during which time Colonel Johnson was commandant of the City so the
command of the 68th fell to Captain Winniett.
Late in August Wellington moved north
to Diuro to finish off the army defeated at Salamanca. The 7th
set out to join him on the 1st September but was held up
on the 10th by a French garrison at Burgos. During the
investment the 68th was bivouacked at Olmos. Here
conditions were very damp and unhealthy which resulted in a
considerable rise in the sick list and the regiment rapidly declined
to only 245 present, fit. The investment of Burgos proved a slow
and tedious operation and the town was stoutly defended. During the
next few weeks a strong French force moved up and drove in the
outlying British units. Not only that but a strong French force was
moving up on Madrid. By the 21st October Wellington dad
decided upon retreat as the only way out.
During this period the 68th
was involved in several skirmishes around Olmos, to cover the
retreat, but later on French pressure slackened considerably due to
the foul weather which considerably dampened the morale of the
troops who were obliged to march in rain and through mud as well as
having top sleep out in the open during the freezing nights.
When the returns were made out on the
25th November at Alamedilla there were 235 present, fit
and 247 sick.
Although there had been no casualties
in the skirmishing around Olmos four men had been captured.
At the end of the retreat the 68th
was placed in twin cantonments of Pecos de Bavo and Pacos de Cima.
By December the strength was so low that Wellington considered
fusing several weak regiments. It was rumoured that the 51st
and the 68th were to be fused and moved to the light
division with the 43rd and 52nd. These however
did not happen.
What did happen was a considerable
reorganisation of the 7th division. The 68th,
51st,1st/82nd and Chasseurs
Britanniques became the fourth battalion.
During the winter conditions improved
radically with new clothing, lighter duty, regular rations,
reinforcements, improved quarters and new shoes. Johnston returned
from Madrid in April 1813 and on the 25th of that month
the strength of the regiment was up to 439, present, fit which was
the highest figure since the arrival in the Peninsula.
Wellington had decided upon a plan for
the invasion of Spain. He decided to face his army to the north and
cross the Duoro at the ferry stations of Regua Viltainntio and
Pocintio.
This plan, though simple, was totally
unexpected. No one had ever thought of an invasion being planned
like this. The army was divided into three columns one to take each
crossing. The 7th as always was on the right and all
three crossed the Duoror without mishap, however, floods made the
crossing of the second obstacle the river Esla very difficult. The
left and centre columns were able to cross but not the right, which
had to wait until the floods subsided.
After crossing the rivers, the army was
able to move across the Castilian plain eventually and enter the
mountains of Cantabina all of which was accomplished without any
real resistance from the French, although once in the mountains they
had to face a much worse foe than the French – hunger. For some time
the army was very short of food, but on the 19th June the
army was positioned along the river Bayas where the French who had
been continually outflanked by Wellington determined to stand and
fight. Consequently they took up a strong position covering the town
of Victora.
Wellington prepared to attack and he
opened the fighting on the 21st which resulted in the
French army being driven back to form a line between Margarita and
Lemanda. The 7th was not able to participate in this
action as indecision on the part of the divisional commander
prevented the division being usefully deployed.
However after this bad start the 68th
was able to distinguish itself by charging the village of Lemanda.
Although they were obliged to shelter from artillery fire in a
ditch, the coolness and courage of the men enabled them to press
the attack and clear the French from the village, the defenders
were not really French at all but German irregulars, 250 of whom
were captured.
As a result of this defeat on their
flank the French forces crumbled and retreated, leaving their
baggage behind.
These were full of treasure, of which
the troops soon emptied them. When the men of the 68th
were searched they were found to have an average of £32 10s.
8 ¾. They had earned it though for 26
officers and men were dead and many including Colonel Johnson were
wounded.
Having invested the towns of St.
Sebastian and Pamplona, both of which been heavily garrisoned by the
French, Wellington advanced into the Pyrenees.
Despite his recent decisive victory
Wellington was aware of the great weakness of the British position.
To invade Spain via the Pyrenees as the
French could be infinitely easier, for geographical reasons, than to
invade France via the Pyrenees, as the British would have to.
Wellington would also have to leave two very strong garrisons of
enemy behind him at St. Sebastian and Pamplona. Not only that, but
the present international political situation made an invasion of
France undesirable from Wellingtons point of view.
The French armies had since come under
the command of Marshal Soult who soon re-established their morale,
naturally low after the defeat at Vitoria. However Soult was soon
able to prepare his armies for an offensive aimed at relieving
Pamplona.
The result was a double pronged attack
on the British positions on the 25th of July. One attack
was aimed at Hills division at the Maya and the other was aimed at
Coles division at Roncesvalles. The 7th went to the
assistance of Hill and the 2nd division at the pass of
Maya and held the attack. However, Cole and his men had fallen back
and for fear of being outflanked the 2nd and 7th
divisions were obliged to retreat also.
The French were able to advance almost
to Pamplona but a stand by the army in front of the town forced them
back, so although Soult had forced the British to give ground he had
been unable to take the town.
Soult now embarked upon a dangerous
move to join up with DErlon which could only be accomplished by
traversing the front of the British army. Wellington not wishing to
miss such a chance to deal his enemies a severe blow attacked on the
30th July.
The 7th was detached to
attack the French flank which was in a valley west of Ulzama. The
French resisted considerably but eventually, and with heavy losses,
the 7th drove them back. A notable officer of the 68th,
Major Crespign, was killed in this action. The regiment greeted the
news of his death with profound relief as he was a particularly
brutal type, even in the nineteenth century when officers were never
noted for their humanity.
The 31st , 82nd,
51st, Chasseurs Britanniques and the 68th were
sent to dislodge a very strong body of DErlons Corps, who were
very well entrenched on a steep and wooded hill from which they were
able to pour fire upon Hills division which was engaging the mass
of retreating enemy. The hill although almost impregnable was taken,
a great tribute to the courage and tenacity of the attackers.
Several more days of shirmishing
followed, the French were driven farther and farther back, their
position eventually became critical although this was not apparent
to Wellington who therefore did not destroy them utterly as he might
have done, Soult at last rallied 25.000 of his men and prepared for
a stand on the heights behind Echalar. Three British divisions
instantly attacked and scattered the French forces who withdrew
across the frontier.
On the 22nd August the 7th
resumed the position it had occupied before the battle. During the
battle the French had lost 12.500 men whereas the British losses
were 6.500. The French were no longer an effective force in .
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